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Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind
CHARLES L. BARZUNt
INTRODUCTION
Whether or not "we are all realists now," the movement
in legal theory that emerged from a few law schools in the
1920s and 1930s and came to be known as "Legal Realism"~
continues to hold a grip on the attention of legal scholars.'
Both its meaning and its ultimate significance remain
subjects of intense debate. Scholars disagree not only about
what the core jurisprudential claims of Legal Realism were,'
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I would like to thank the
following people for helpful comments on this and earlier drafts: Josh Bowers,
Neil Duxhury, Robert W. Gordon, Rachel Harmon, Mike Kiarman, Jody Kraus,
Sarah Lawsky, Brian Leiter, Greg Mitchell, Jedediah Purdy, George
Rutherglen, Fred Schauer, John H. Schlegel, Micah Schwartzman, Zahr
Stauffer, Simon Stern, Brian Tamanaha, Cora True-Frost, and G.E. White, as
well as participants in the University of Virginia School of Law Summer
Workshop Series.
1. Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Legal Theory, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1917 (2005) (denying the truth of that claim, but noting that it has
been repeated so often that "it has become a clich.6 to call it a 'clich6."').
2. Compare LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 3 (1986)
(suggesting that the best description of Realist jurisprudence is "functionalism,"
by which she means a tendency to evaluate the law by its effects), with Joseph
William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (1988)
(criticizing Kalman's account and arguing that a central ambition of Legal
Realism was to reconceptualize the public-private distinction). Compare Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 626 (1984) (suggesting a link between the
Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement and Legal Realism on the ground that
both denied the autonomy of law and legal reasoning), with G. Edward White,
From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW.
L.J. 819, 841 (1986) (suggesting that Critical Legal Studies is properly seen to
be "the heir to only one phase of the Realist movement, its deconstructionist.
phase"). For other works on Legal Realism, see generally WILFRID E. RUMBLE,
JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1968); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (1973).
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but also about whether one can even profitably generalize
about "Realist" positions in the first place.' They even
debate whether the Realists' insights amounted to a
genuine and novel contribution to legal theory at all.'
Within these larger debates about Legal Realism,
Jerome Frank occupies an odd place. For a long time, he
was widely considered to be, along with Karl Llewellyn, one
of the two thought-leaders of the Realists.' And his most
famous contribution to legal theory, Law and the Modern
Mind, is still regarded as a legal classic.' But these days
Frank is typically characterized as an "extreme" Realist,
3. Compare NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 68-69
(1995) (concluding that Legal Realism is best described as a "tendency" and
"'more a mood than a movement"), with BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE 89 (2007) (criticizing Duxbury's description of Realism as
"unduly vague and even misleading" in part because the descriptive thesis that
Duxbury himself correctly ascribes to the Realists, namely that the facts of
cases determine legal outcomes more than rules do, "surely constitutes a
positive (as opposed to merely negative) thesis about adjudication: what I have
called elsewhere 'the Core Claim' of Realism").
4. Compare LEITER, supra note 3, at 1 ("American Legal Realism was, quite
justifiably, the major intellectual event in 20th century American legal practice
and scholarship."), with Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87
TEX. L. REV. 731, 734 (challenging Leiter's assessment of Realism's significance
and doubting "the historical distinctiveness of the Legal Realists as a group").
5. See KALMAN, supra note 2, at 164 (referring to Frank as "the father of
legal realism"); SCHLEGEL, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that earlier scholars of
Realism tended to focus on Llewellyn and Frank); TWINING, supra note 2, at 405
n.2 ("Jerome Frank ... is usually treated as one of the two leading 'realists',
[Karl] Llewellyn being the other."); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 8 1-86
(1973) (focusing primarily on Frank and Llewellyn in his account of Legal
Realism); RUMBLE, supra note 2, at 107 (focusing his study of Legal Realism on
Llewellyn and Frank, particularly Frank's "fact-skepticism"); Tamanaha, supra
note 4, at 736 (asking rhetorically, "but if not Llewellyn and Frank-who both
separately and in collaboration coined realism as a label in the legal context-
then who?").
6. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) [hereinafter FRANK];
see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103
DAEDALUS 119, 121-22 (1973) (book review) ("While no single work is typical of
the Realist movement, Jerome Frank's book, Law and the Modern Mind, has
worn comparatively well and is probably the most comprehensive Realist effort
to expose the fallacies involved in the Classical effort to state legal rules clearly
and to systematize them around fundamental legal principles.").
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who was a peripheral figure in the movement.' He tends to
be treated as an erratic, if perhaps brilliant, thinker who
made some insightful critiques but who never even
attempted to develop anything like a coherent theory of
adjudication or a constructive vision for reform.'
This view of Frank seems to me deeply mistaken, and
the aim of this essay is to correct it. I do so by offering a
close reading of Law and the Modern Mind that situates it
within the intellectual context in which it was written. My
argument, in short, is that generations of scholars have
misinterpreted Frank because they have misunderstood his
philosophical worldview and, therefore, his Intellectual
ambitions. Frank may be more to blame for this
misunderstanding than his critics. He said many different
things in the book, not all of them consistent, and some of
them perplexing. But if one takes Law and the Modern
Mind on its own terms and if one reads its argument as a
whole, rather than simply as a series of one-off critiques,
one can see that Frank did not deny the possibility of
rational legal decision making, but rather sought to
articulate the habits of mind and character on which he
believed the sound administration of justice depended.
My hope is thus to show that a proper reading of Frank
reveals another side of Legal Realism-one with some
surprising intellectual heirs. As the title of his book
suggests, Frank was above all concerned with the judicial
mind. For him, legal progress depended less on getting the
right institutions or rules in place than on properly training
people to populate those institutions and to apply those
rules. Today, in political, moral, and legal philosophy, we
call theories that focus on qualities of mind and character in
this way "virtue" theories because they tend to see
particular human characteristics-virtues and vices-as the
appropriate object of analysis and evaluation.' It is true that
Frank rarely used the term "virtue" himself, and was wary
of labels that purported to classify any group of thinkers,'
but the burden of this Article is to show why seeing Frank
7. See infra notes 14-15.
8. See infra note 14.
9. See infra pp. 1167-1171.
10. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, at vii-ix (Coward-
McCann, Inc. 1949) (1930) [hereinafter FRANK -1949].
2010] 129
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as a virtue theorist, albeit of a rather idiosyncratic sort, is
more illuminating than obscuring. Most importantly, doing
so shows the sense in which-contrary to what critics have
alleged-Frank did offer a theory of adjudication and a
proposal for directing legal reform.
What follows is an attempt to recover and articulate
what I take to be Frank's core concerns in Law and the
Modern Mind. These concerns became even more
pronounced in Frank's later work, but I focus on his first
book because it is generally considered Frank's most radical
and critical attack on legal orthodoxy. Part I briefly surveys
the scholarly criticism of Law and the Modern Mind and
suggests that critics have misunderstood Frank's project
because they have failed to properly place his philosophical
views within the intellectual debates of his time. The next
three parts look closely at each of the key components of the
book's argument. Frank first describes what he calls the
"Basic Legal Myth" ("Myth"), namely the belief in legal
certainty, so Part 11 examines Frank's account of the Myth
and why he finds it harmful. There I distinguish among
Frank's empirical critique, his normative critique of rule-
based decision making, and his conceptual critique of the
Myth's conception of law as a series of rules. I suggest that
only the empirical critique warrants the label "'extreme."~
Part III then surveys the various explanations Frank
considers for the Myth's persistence among laypeople,
lawyers, and judges. The explanation Frank settles on,
which is the most controversial aspect of his book, is that
the longing for legal certainty stems from an unconscious
desire in judges and laypeople to maintain the sense of
security that a person's father provides in childhood. I argue
that this "father- substitute" explanation for the Myth is
best understood not as a literal causal explanation of the
desire for legal certainty, but as a useful heuristic or
"fiction" that Frank hoped would channel reform efforts in
the right direction, namely the cultivation of a "modern
mind" in judges.
Thus, in Part IV, I explain what Frank meant by a
"modern mind" (or what he also called the "scientific
spirit"). In short, I argue that it described a set of judicial
excellences or virtues that included a capacity for reflecting
accurately on one's own emotions and beliefs and the
courage to act in the face of deep epistemic uncertainty.
That Frank's analysis of these mental attributes was
cloaked in the language of psychology and psychoanalysis
1130 Vol. 58
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should not obscure the fact that what he was articulating
was essentially a normative theory of adjudication based on
a substantive set of moral and intellectual virtues. My hope
is now that discussions of judicial character have once again
become academically respectable in law and philosophy,
Frank's contribution to this intellectual tradition may be
more justly appreciated." And if my account is persuasive,
it suggests that scholars may have ignored a strand of Legal
Realism that puts human character at the center of
jurisprudential inquiry.
1. LA wAND THE MODERN MIND AND ITS CRITICS
From the moment it was published, Law and the
Modern Mind has been the subject of commentary and
controversy. Judge Charles Clark wrote years later that it
fell "like a bomb on the legal world" when it was published."2
Within months it was attacked by critics of the nascent
Legal Realist movement and defended by Realist allies,
though even the allies found things in it with which to
quarrel." More recent scholarly treatments of it have
varied. It was long considered to be a definitive Realist text,
but recently scholars tend to treat Frank's work as very
much outside mainstream Realism.'" Frequently it is
characterized as one of the more ''extreme"~ or radical
Realist attacks on traditional jurisprudence, though the
11. For recent discussions of judicial character, both normative and
empirical, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT
CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009); RICHARD A.
POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DEIENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008); Paul Horwitz,
Judicial Character (and Does it Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2009).
12. Charles E. Clark, Jerome N. Frank, 66 YALE L. J. 817, 817 (1957).
13. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, Mortimer J. Adler & Walter Wheeler Cook, Law
and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 82-115 (1931) (book
review).
14. See LEITER, supra note 3, at 17 (criticizing scholars' tendency to identify
Frank with Realism generally); SCHLEGEL, supra note 2, at 5-6 (noting that
Frank and Llewellyn had quite different styles); TWINING, supra note 2, at 405-
06 n.2 (noting that Frank was "something of an outsider" and did not share with
the other Realists an ambition "to do 'objective' empirical research"); Singer,
supra note 2, at 470 n.6 (criticizing the importance Laura Kalman ascribes to
Frank and labeling Frank as "a peripheral figure" in Realism).
2010] 131
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respect in which it was extreme is not always clear."5
Usually it refers to the extent of legal uncertainty Frank
observed and the relative causal insignificance of legal rules
to case outcomes;16 other times it refers to his "fact
skepticism";"7 still other times to his alleged denial of
rational adjudication." Finally, Morton Horwitz takes a
quite different tack, describing Law and the Modern Mind
as embodying an "existentialist" strand of Legal Realism."
As we will see, that characterization hits close to the mark,
but Horwitz does not develop this insight, aside from noting
its connection to the philosophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes
and William James."0 If there is any consensus about the
book, it is that its argument was enmeshed in an outdated
psychological theory and that (perhaps relatedly) it failed to
offer any kind of affirmative program. Frank's "father-
substitute" explanation for the desire for legal certainty has
been a perennial target. Some criticize it for simply being
bad science.2 ' Others have suggested that it is best
explained-and explained away-by Frank's own
experience undergoing psychoanalysis. 2 Even those who
15. See Rodger D. Citron, The Nuremburg Trials and American
Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, the Revival of Natural Law, and
the Development of Legal Process Theory, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 385, 391
("[Frank's] views made him an extreme-and extremely clear-spoken-legal
realist.").
16. See LEITER, supra note 3, at 17 n.12; PURCELL, supra note 5, at 82.
17. RUMBLE, supra note 2, at 38.
18. Even those who recognize that Frank passionately defended the power of
reason in other areas characterize that later defense as standing in tension with
Law and the Modern Mind. See ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAw 25 (1985); Neil Duxhury,
Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 18 ,J.L. & Soc'y 175, 183 (1991).
19. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 176-77 (1992).
20. Id.
21. Llewellyn, Adler & Cook, supra note 13, at 96 (Adler's contribution)
(calling Frank's discussion of psychology "a poor statement of psychoanalytical
theory"); Duxhury, supra note 18, at 182 (noting that Frank's account is "built
upon a mixture of psychoanalytical concepts and insights strung together rather
haphazardly according to the dictates of his own curious speculation").
22. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 870 (1995) (asking students to consider
whether Frank's father figure theory is "telling us something about how we view
law or about his own relationship to his father?"); WALTER E. VOLKOMER, THE
1132 Vol. 58
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endorse Frank's other arguments in the book encourage
readers to more or less ignore his psychological one."3 But
regardless of the validity of Frank's psychological
speculations, most seem to agree that the work as a whole
was primarily a critical attack on legal formalism and that
it failed to offer any kind of constructive vision for legal
reform. 24
One can find support for each one of these views in the
text of Law and the Modern Mind. Many of its themes, such
as the influence of traditionally "non-legal" factors on case
outcomes , are familiar Realist ones; at the same time,
PASSIONATE LIBERAL: THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL IDEAS OF JEROME FRANK 216
(1970) (noting that Frank's father-figure theory "probably came to Frank as an
insight during analysis").
23. See Brian H. Bix, Introduction to JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND, at xv (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1930) [hereinafter FRANK 2009]
(noting that he agreed with Llewellyn that "Frank's psychoanalytic approach is
more distracting than helpful."); POSNER, supra note 11, at 118 (calling Frank's
proposal that judges undergo psychoanalysis "ridiculous" but noting that
Frank's "emphasis on the psychological dimension of judging was not
ridiculous"); J. MITCHELL ROSENBERG, JEROME FRANK: JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER
17 (1970) ("Divorced of its theoretical and mythical psychological underpinning,
Law and the Modern Mind still represents a landmark volume in the annals of
jurisprudence."); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 130-31 (2009)
("psychological silliness in Frank's work should not blind us to the importance
and arguable soundness of his major insight," namely that non-legal factors play
a role in determining case outcomes); Llewellyn, Adler, & Cook, supra note 13,
at 85-86 (rhetorically asking, "[hiow is it possible for the canny student who
discriminates so skillfully the proved from the dubious when reading a legal
writer to swallow at a gulp a yearning for the pre-natal serenity which is not
only unproved but unprovable?").
24. See HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 209 (distinguishing between two "faces" of
Realism, "one critical, another reformist and constructive," and noting that the
"social science reformism" came to dominate after 1933); JULIUS PAUL, THE
LEGAL REALISM OF JEROME N. FRANK: A STUDY OF FACT-SKEPTICISM AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 49 (1959) ("That [Frank] did not develop a definitive
philosophy of law is not a fair criticism, because the American legal realists
were generally averse to any official creed or doctrine of law. .. ); VOLKOMER,
supra note 22, at 20-41 (recognizing that Frank meant his skepticism to be
"1constructive," but criticizing Law and the Modern Mind for its failure to offer
any affirmative program for legal reform); Citron, supra note 15, at 392 ("In
Law and the Modern Mind, Frank described 'the basic legal myth'-the myth of
certainty-and explained its causes. He did not, however, prescribe a solution
for it."); Duxbury, supra note 18, at 183 (describing Frank's praise of the
,'modern mind," but concluding that Franked advanced "~no programme [sic] for
cultivating this new mind").
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Frank had a flair for the dramatic and often leveled
critiques in more hyperbolic language than was warranted,
giving the book a vituperative quality. Nor is it free of
internal inconsistency. Sometimes, for instance, Frank
seemed to say that rules play a constraining role in legal
decision making; at other points, he suggested that they
were incapable of playing such a role." The form and
structure of his book only aggravate this problem. The
argument is presented piecemeal, with one ramblingly-
titled chapter following another, in no logical order, followed
by eight separate and unconnected appendices."6 All of
which lends support to the judgment of one scholar about
Frank's contribution as a whole: "Clever rather than wise, a
dilettante intellectual rather than a scholar, a brilliant
controversialist, but somewhat erratic in his judgments, in
his juristic writings Frank exhibited the strengths and
weaknesses of a first-class journalist. 2
Nevertheless, the impression left by these accounts of
Law and the Modern Mind profoundly misrepresents its
central argument and the core concerns of its author. For all
the reasons just mentioned, Frank deserves much of the
blame for the disconnect. But scholars have also
misunderstood Frank's intellectual motivations, I think,
because they have had a somewhat cramped view of the
philosophical debates taking place during the time in which
25. Compare FRANK, supra note 6, at 100 ("Judging begins rather the other
way around-with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will
substantiate it. If he cannot, to his satisfaction, find proper arguments to link
up his conclusion with premises which he finds acceptable, he will, unless he is
arbitrary or mad, reject the conclusion and seek another."), with FRANK, supra
note 6, at 128 ("There is no rule by which you can force a judge to follow an old
rule or by which you can predict when he will verbalize his conclusion in the
form of a new rule . .. His decision is primary, the rules he may happen to refer
to are incidental."). See RIC-HARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION:
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 29 (1961) (noting Frank's
inconsistency on this point).
26. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 6, at Ch. X-TV, "Illusory Precedents: The
Future: Judicial Somnambulism," 148-59.
27. TWINING, supra note 2, at 379; see also PAUL, supra note 24, at 134 ("One
valid criticism of Jerome Frank's writing has been the slipshod manner in which
he deals with his materials. His books are a conglomeration of various and
diverse materials gleaned from voluminous reading, but sometimes without
adequate digestion of their contents.").
1134 Vol. 58
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Frank wrote. They seem to have assumed that there were
mainly two opposing philosophical camps at that time. On
one side were what Professor Edward Purcell has called
"cscientific naturalists,'' who confidently asserted that
science revealed empirical truths about the world but who
denied the objectivity of ethical values."8 Opposing them
were religious and moral "absolutists," who affirmed the
existence of objective standards, derived through a priori
reasoning, that could be used to justify ethical positions. To
the absolutists, scientific naturalism seemed to imply
ethical relativism and moral nihilism."
If those were the only options available, then the
conventional interpretations of Frank make some sense. For
under this view, the Legal Realists, including Frank, clearly
fell within the scientific naturalist camp. All legitimate
theoretical inquiry required the study of observable
phenomena, which, in turn, required drawing a sharp
distinction between facts, which could be observed, and
values, which could not be."0 Progress in legal theory and
practice thus primarily entailed the application of
empiricist methods to the legal domain." The ethical
28. See PURCELL, supra note 5, at 11 (describing the core characteristics of
the scientific naturalists).
29. See id. at 139-58.
30. See GLENNON, supra note 18, at 57 ("Edward Purcell has convincingly.
demonstrated that realism was part of a social science movement, known as
scientific naturalism, which rejected the idea that absolute rational principles
govern the universe."); LEITER, supra note 3, at 57-58 ("The 1920s and the 1930s
marked the heyday of 'positivism,' in philosophy and the social sciences: natural
science was viewed as the paradigm of all genuine knowledge and any
discipline-from philosophy to sociology-which wanted to attain epistemic
respectability had to emulate its methods, i.e., had to be 'naturalized."'); PAUL,
supra note 24, at 43 ("To Jerome Frank, this struggle is not exclusively in the
domain of jurisprudence: it is the battle of modern science, the search for
empirical truth amidst dogma, the age-old struggle to free men's minds from the
shackles of past emotion and sentimentality. . . ."); PURCELL, supra note 5, at 49
("American social scientists agreed by the early thirties that the scientific
method could offer no validation of ethical judgments."); SCHLEGEL, supra note
2, at 5-6 (praising Purcell's book but noting that it excludes various debates
among Realists); White, supra note 2, at 823 (suggesting that the Realists
assumed that "while arguments based on legal doctrines were necessarily value
laden, arguments based on empirical observation" were value-free).
31. See GLENNON, supra note 18, at 48 ("Frank pioneered in using social
science analysis to study the law, but his effort never took hold."); KALmAN,
supra note 2, at 17 ("The realists looked to the social sciences to help them
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"ought" for such a project was either taken for granted or
temporarily bracketed until later. If Frank saw the world
this way, then it is easy to see how his skepticism about the
predictive power of the social sciences would seem to reflect
a cynicism about legal progress. It is also not hard to see
how his patently psychological explanation of the demand
for legal certainty would seem to imply irrationalism about
human cognitive capacities. This reading is especially
understandable given that Frank did occasionally appear to
endorse this scientific naturalist position."2
But those were not the only philosophical options
available. In addition to those two, a third strand of
philosophical thinking at that time attempted to reconcile
the rationality of ethical, aesthetic, and even religious
values within a largely naturalistic worldview. 3 Like that of
the scientific naturalists, this view emphasized experience
as a source of knowledge, but it differed from the scientific
naturalist position in two ways. First, it stuck to its
empiricist guns in rejecting any metaphysical view about
the ultimate nature of reality, including a materialist one.3
reform jurisprudence. A determination to integrate law with the social sciences
pervaded their functionalism."); PURCELL, supra note 5, at 78 ("If [the Realists]
were to be professional scientists, they argued, then they must be truly
scientific. In the twenties that injunction pointed in just one direction-
cooperation with the confident new social sciences."), 85-86 ("Llewellyn and
Frank were united in calling for careful empirical studies of the way the law
actually operated in society . . ."); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 124-25 (1978) (noting that Frank shared with Llewellyn a belief
that judicial decision making could be "improved by an abandonment of
artificial logical concepts and an increased use of empirical data gleaned from
'scientific' studies of contemporary social phenomena.").
32. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 6, at 132 ("But if we are not to be befogged by
words we will not assume that the 'principles of law' are similar to the
'principles of biology.' The principles of biology are based directly on the
biologist's description of the conduct of animal organisms; the principles of law
are often only remotely related to judicial conduct."). Though, even here the
problem with legal principles seems to lie in their remoteness from what judges
actually do, not in the fact that they refer to questions that are inherently
indeterminate.
33. Schlegel makes a similar criticism of Purcell on this front. See SCHLEGEL,
supra note 2, at 6 (noting that Purcell's focus on the Catholic critics of Realism
obscures other critiques of Realism by such scholars as Morris Cohen, Roscoe
Pound, John Dickinson, and Lon Fuller).
34. By 'materialist' I mean to describe a metaphysical view according to
which the only thing that exists in the world is matter (as compared, for
210] FRANK AND THE MODERN MIND 13
Second, it had a broader notion of what experience included;
specifically, it included common-sense intuitions embedded
in human experience. Its defense of the rationality of ethical
and other values was thus two-pronged. By refusing to
commit itself to any metaphysical picture-including a
materialist one-it held out the possibility of, at the very
least, human free will and perhaps even a moral reality. By
counting deep intuitions about values as components of
individual experience, it legitimized the values based on
those intuitions as consistent with an empiricist
epistemology that 3had proven so successful in achieving
scientific progress. 5
One could fairly label this philosophical view
"pragmatist,'' but that term has been used to refer to so
many different methods and philosophies that it probably
obscures more than it clarifies." Another good candidate is
"humanist," but that too is plagued by similar difficulties.
More important than the label is whose views it plausibly
describes. It describes, very roughly, the views of the
philosophers on whom Frank relied most heavily in Law
and the Modern Mind, Hans Vaihinger and F.C.S. Schiller,
as well as other, far better known figures whose works he
also drew upon, such as William James and John Dewey."
instance, to dualism, which asserts that everything in the world is either matter
or mind). Today, many philosophers endorse a comparable view called
"physicalism," which is sometimes distinguished from the older term
"materialism" on the ground that not everything physical is necessarily matter.
But for our purposes, any slight distinction between the two is not significant.
See William Seager, Physicalism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 340 (W. H. Newton-Smith ed., 2000) (noting that the distinction
between physicalism and materialism is "vague and murky" and that for many
philosophers the two terms are "interchangeable synonyms").
35. WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 238 (Harvard University Press
1978) (1885) ("The essential service of humanism, as I conceive the situation is
to have seen that tho [sic] one part of our experience may lean upon another part
to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered,
experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on nothing . . .. It seems, at
first sight, to confine itself to denying theism and pantheism. But, in fact, it
need not deny either.").
36. See LEITER, supra note 3, at 46 ("Unfortunately, [the term pragmatism]
has been so recklessly overused in recent years that it has been rendered, by
now, either utterly banal or simply empty.").
37. For connections between Vaihinger and Schiller, and both to pragmatism,
see, for example, EUGENE THOMAS LONG, TWENTIETH-CENTURY WESTERN
20101 137
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Of course, these philosophers all differed in important
respects .38 But, all of them sought to affirm the possibility of
human freedom and the rationality of human moral or
spiritual values within a broadly naturalistic framework."9
And so did Frank. He was skeptical about the
possibility of gaining "objective" knowledge about the world
but confident in the possibility of intellectual, legal and
moral progress. And like these philosophers, he sought to
reconcile these two seemingly contradictory positions by
assessing intellectual progress by reference to the practical
fruits a given theory bore rather than to its supposed
correspondence to some "reality." In determining what
counts as such practical benefits, he was reluctant to draw
firm distinctions between the philosophical and
psychological domains, between reason and emotion, and
between fact and value.
Once we see that Frank adopted this humanistic
philosophical perspective, his book's true radicalism
appears to lie less in what it criticized than in what it
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 1900-2000 67 (2000) (noting that Vaihinger is often
classified as a pragmatist and shares "much in common with F.C.S. Schiller");
Steve Fuller, Richard Rorty's Philosophical Legacy, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCIENCES 121,
122 (2008) ("Hans Vaihinger and F.C.S. Schiller are two largely forgotten
figures of the period who articulated philosophies that were 'pragmatist,'
sometimes even in name."). Frank also mentioned other philosophers, such as
G.B. Foster and Alfred North Whitehead, who shared similar philosophical
motivations. See FRANK, supra note 6, at 201, 248.
38. For instance, Vaihinger was far more committed to Darwinism than
Schiller, and James looked more to individual experience than Dewey, who
emphasized the role of society in generating values.
39. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 165 (1920) ("After
all, then, we are only pleading for the adoption in moral reflection of the logic
that has proved to make for security, stringency and fertility in passing
judgments upon physical phenomena."); WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 106 (1907)
(criticizing materialism for its failure to offer "a permanent warrant for our
more ideal interests, [or] a fulfiller of our remotest hopes") F.C.S. SCHILLER,
STUDIES IN HUMANISM 10 (1907) ("[T]he most essential feature of Pragmatism
may well seem its insistence on the fact that . .. all mental life is purposive.
This insistence in reality embodies the pragmatic protest against naturalism,
and as such ought to receive the cordial support of rationalist idealisms."); HANS
VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'As IV at xlvii (C.K. Ogden trans., Harcourt,
Brace & Co. Inc., 1925) (1924) (explaining his philosophy of "As If" as a form of
"1positivist idealism" and emphasizing that the world of "unreal" fictions is "as
important as the world of so-called real or actual (in the ordinary sense of that
word)" and "far more important for ethics and aesthetics").
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affirmed. Law and the Modern Mind is, in brief, an apology
for a particular kind of philosophical stance or attitude.
From its attack on legal orthodoxy, to its diagnosis of what
plagues legal thought, to the remedy it offers as a cure for
the Myth's symptoms, the book constitutes one long,
sustained demand for the cultivation of a quality of mind
that Frank sometimes called the "modern mind" and at
other times called the "scientific spirit." But to see why he
thought such cultivation could serve as a balm for what
plagued legal thinking, we must first understand what
Frank took the problem to be.
11. THE SYMPTOMS: THE BASIC LEGAL MYTH AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
Much of Frank's critique of the Myth in Law and the
Modern Mind invoked such familiar Realist themes as the
vagueness of formal rules and the influence of traditionally
non-legal sources on case outcomes. It was also probably a
gross caricature of how most, or at least many, judges at the
time actually viewed the law."0 What concerns us here,
however, is clarifying exactly what his criticisms of the
40. See Tamanaha, supra, note 4, at 748 ("Virtually all the core insights about
judging associated with the Realists were prominently stated decades before,
often by Historical Jurists."). Tamanaha argues that Frank not only overstated
the prevalence of the Myth among judges of his time, but deliberately distorted
the views of some of the jurists he cited as evidence of the Myth. As some
evidence of this distortion, Tamanaha points to a passage Frank quotes from a
work by Sir Henry Maine in which Maine refers to a belief in legal certainty and
permanence, seemingly in support of Frank's thesis about the prevalence of the
Myth. But Frank excised from the passage a sentence where Maine explicitly
says that "we now admit" that the law is not complete and that court decisions
change the law. But Tamanaha himself fails to include the sentence before that
sentence, which reads, "Yet the moment the judgment has been rendered and
reported, we slide unconsciously or unavowedly into a new language and a new
train of thought. We now admit that the new decision has modified the law."
HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 31 (1861) (emphasis added). The first sentence
makes clear that Maine was not contrasting the current view of law with an
older view according to which law was certain and changeless. Rather, Maine
was drawing attention to how views about the changeability of any given law
changes once a judicial decision is rendered. Tamahana adduces other
persuasive textual evidence as well, but none, to my mind, definitively
establishes that Frank's use amounted to a "calculated distortion" of Maine.
Frank could have reasonably believed that Maine held the view Frank ascribed
to him.
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Myth were, regardless of whether or not they were
deserved. In doing so, we can usefully distinguish among
three distinct critiques Frank leveled against the Myth: an
empirical critique, a normative critique, and a conceptual
critique. Let us consider each in turn.
Frank identified the indeterminacy of legal rules as the
source of much of the actual uncertainty in the law. The
language of statutes and court opinions was sufficiently
vague that rival interpretations were always possible,
making it nearly impossible to predict which interpretation
a court would choose. Until we knew how another court
would interpret a previous court's ruling, we could not say
what the rule of that case was."1 Instead of rules, what
really determined the outcome of court decisions was a host
of "subjective factors-desires and aims which push and
pull us about without regard to the objective situation.""2
Frank quoted at length Judge Hutcheson, who had
explained that judges based their decisions on a "hunch," by
which he meant "that intuitive flash of understanding that
makes the jump-spark connection between question and
decision . . . ." Judges, though, like most people, were
typically unaware of the influence of these factors-or
"biases," as Frank called them-on their thinking.'
Although, of course, judges spoke as if they were applying
rules, they only did so after they had reached their
conclusions based on this "hunch."" The reasoning
articulated in a judicial opinion was, then, best understood
as an ex-post "rationalization."" Given that such factors,
and not rules, determined the outcome of cases, "[w]hatever
produces the judge's hunches makes the law."4 "
This all sounds like standard Realist fare, but what
made Frank "extreme" among the Realists was his
skepticism about our capacity to predict the outcome of legal
41. See FRANK, supra note 6, at 124-25.
42. Id. at 28.
43. Id. at 103 (quoting Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment -Intuitive: The
Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 278 (1929)).
44. Id. at 28.
45. Id. at 103.
46. Id. at 29-30.
47. Id. at 104.
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decisions by reference to any observable factors."8 Whereas
other Realists hoped to use social science to identify and
predict case outcomes, Frank was doubtful that such efforts
would find much success. He identified at least two reasons
to be skeptical. First, even when the meaning of a rule was
so clear that there was wide consensus as to what the
outcome should be on a given set of facts, judges might
interpret those facts differently. In trial courts, what the
court determined the "facts" to be depended on whose
testimony the judge or the jury believed. Who the judge
would believe, again, depended on his own biases and
prejudices."9 According to Frank, a trial judge did not even
distinguish his "belief as to the 'facts' from his conclusion as
to the 'law.."'5
Frank's second reason for being skeptical about
predicting case outcomes was that the number of potential
psychological influences on a judge's thinking was too large
for the influences to be usefully categorized for predictive
purposes, as some Realists hoped to do."' Although such
attributes as a judge's race, class, or political ideology were
surely relevant to how they decided cases, they were, for
Frank, "too g ross, too crude, too wide" to form the basis of
predictions.'~ This was particularly true in the context of
fact-finding. In viewing the parties and attorneys to a suit,
Frank explained, the judge's "own past may have created
plus or minus reactions to women, or blonde women, or men
with beards, or Southerners, or Italians, or Englishmen, or
plumbers, or ministers, or college students, or Democrats.""3
Since these reactions were the result of the judge's "entire
life-history," in order to know the true basis of a particular
judge's reasoning, and, therefore, the likely outcome in a
given case, one would need to have information akin to what
48. See LEITER, supra note 3, at 63 (distinguishing Frank as an "extreme"
Realist who did not subscribe to the view that the central goal of legal theory
was "to identify and describe-not justify-the patterns of decision").
49. FRANK, supra note 6, at 106-07.
50. Id. at 116. Frank's skepticism about the accuracy of fact-finding was what
earned him the label-one he welcomed--of a "fact-skeptic." See FRANK-1949,
supra note 10, at ix-x.
51. FRANK, supra note 6, at 151.
52. Id. at 105.
53. Id. at 106.
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one would provide in a "'detailed autobiograph[y]."" It is
thus fair to characterize Frank as "extreme" in his
skepticism about our capacity to use scientific methods to
predict case outcomes."5
But Frank was far less concerned with identifying, let
alone preventing, the degree of actual legal uncertainty that
existed than he was with rejecting the goal of legal certainty
itself. His protest against the Myth was not simply that it
was false. The problem was that it encouraged people to
demand certainty and predictability in the law, and that
demand, in turn, required judges to adhere strictly to rules.
Frank thus lamented "the insistent effort to achieve
predictability by the attempt to mechanize the law, to
reduce it to formulas in which human beings are treated
like identical mathematical entities. 5
For Frank, then, rule-based decision making itself was
the problem and for reasons now familiar to every first-year
law student. "To apply rules mechanically," he insisted,
"usually signifies laziness, or callousness to the peculiar
factors presented by the controversy."" Frank believed that
the predictability which the generality of the law made
possible came at the cost of accuracy and, therefore justice,
in adjudication-a plausible and relatively uncontroversial
view of the costs and benefits of rule-based decision
making." Here Frank was directly attacking not just the
54. Id. at 114-15.
55. One of his biographers takes Frank to task on this score. See GLENNON,
supra note 18, at 50 ("He trivialized his argument, however, by making judicial
decisions turn on whimsical irrelevancies, such as the color of a person's hair. If
he had placed his analysis on historical and demonstrable grounds, such as
racial, ethnic, or sexual prejudice, or perhaps economic class and interests, he
would have been on firmer terrain."). One goal of this essay is to show that this
type of criticism misses Frank's deeper point, namely that we should not even
try to render decisions predictable.
56. FRANK, supra note 6, at 118.
57. Id. at 131; see also id. at 55 ("Why is generality so highly prized by
lawyers at the expense of particularity?").
58. Uncontroversial, to be sure, but not necessarily correct. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 98 (2003) ("The inevitable
suboptimality of rules, however, is premised on a supposition about the accuracy
of individualized decisionmaking. We know, however, that this accuracy often
does not exist, and especially when there are reasons of bias and mistake.
among others, to distrust the reliability of the individualized decision."); Charles
L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1987-88 (2008)
1142 Vol. 58
210] FRANK AND THE MODERN MIND 14
relative causal efficacy of written legal rules, but rather the
central values he perceived to lie behind any rule-based
legal regime-generality in decision making for the sake of
predictability of outcomes."9
It may at first seem that Frank's empirical and
normative critiques stand in considerable tension with each
other. According to the former, judges make decisions based
on subjective biases and prejudices, and according to the
latter, judges ought not be constrained by rules. Is this not a
recipe for sanctioned irrationalism? The answer is no, but to
see why we must look to Frank's third, conceptual critique
of the Myth. According to the Myth, "the law"~ consisted
exclusively of legal rules and principles derived from cases
and statutes."0 This was a view Frank clearly rejected, but
what he sought to put in its place is less clear. At times, he
seemed to endorse what Professor Brian Leiter has called
"Conceptual Rule- Skepticism," according to which the law
consists not of any rules at all, but simply whatever courts
decide."' For instance, Frank quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes'
proclamation that "[a] generalization is empty so far as it is
general" and insisted that "[l]aw is made up not of rules for
decision laid down by the courts but of the decisions
themselves."" Thus, "[t]he 'law of a great nation' means the
decisions of a handful of old gentlemen, and whatever they
refuse to decide is not law."6"
But this view seems tough to reconcile with other parts
of the book, where Frank clarified that he did not mean to
deny the existence of rules or legal reasons, only question
(drawing on Schauer's work to make a similar point in the context of
adjudicative fact-finding).
59. Frank does not seem to recognize another purpose generality serves,
namely formal equality. See FRANK, supra note 6, at 131.
60. Id. at 32.
61. LEITER, supra note 3, at 69. Leiter suggests that this was how H. L. A.
Hart (mis)interpreted Frank and the other Realists. See id. at 70; see also H. L.
A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 133 (1961) (referring to "rule-skepticism"7 as the
view that "law consists simply of the decisions of courts and the prediction of
them. ...). Purcell seems to interpret Frank as such a skeptic as well. See
PURCELL, supra note 5, at 82-83.
62. FRANK, supra note 6, at 124-25 (emphasis omitted) (quoting O.W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 240 (1920)).
63. Id. at 125.
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their relative causal importance in legal decision making.
Immediately following his observation, just noted above,
that the law consisted of the "decisions of a handful of old
gentlemen," he continued, "[olf course those old gentlemen
in deciding cases do not follow their own whims, but derive
their views from many sources. And among those sources
are not only statutes, precedents, customs, and the like, but
the rules which other courts have announced when deciding
cases."' Elsewhere, he rejected the view that "to deny that
law consists of rules is to deny the existence of legal rules.""5
Professor Leiter has recently defended the Realists
against the charge of conceptual rule-skepticism by showing
that their arguments presupposed a positivist conception of
law."6 According to Leiter, the Realists argued that non-
legal factors were the real causal determinants of case
outcomes and that this view presupposes the existence of
criteria of legal validity that distinguish between "legal" and
"non-legal" factors. And the substantive criteria that the
Realists presupposed, he argues, were essentially those of
the legal positivist, namely ones that looked to the pedigree
of the rule in an authoritative source such as a statute or
court opinion."
The problem with this response is that however well it
may describe the jurisprudential views of other Realists, it
fails dramatically in characterizing Frank's." The reason is
that Frank was explicit in insisting that the personal,
subjective reactions of judges ought properly be considered a
legitimate part of the law. This was true for two reasons.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 132; see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 162 n.3
(Anchor Books 1963) (1930) [hereinafter FRANK 1963] (clarifying that he was
arguing not that no case could possibly be determined by a legal rule, just that
they were so determined more rarely than was commonly supposed).
66. LEITER, supra note 3, at 72-73.
67. See id. at 45.
68. Though he does not address Frank's views in much depth, the tenor of
Leiter's discussion suggests that he well recognizes this point. And this view is
confirmed by a recent posting on his blog, in which he distinguishes Frank from
other Realists in this regard, though he does so on the basis of Frank's fact-
skepticism. See Brian Leiter, Green on Legal Realism and Naturalized
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First, such personal judgments were inherent in all human
reasoning; and second, they were necessary for the exercise
of sound discretion, which was itself constitutive of law.
On the first point, Frank thought all human
reasoning-even the paradigmatically syllogistic reasoning
of lawyers-had an ineliminable personal, subjective
component. Here he was influenced by the British
philosopher F.C.S. Schiller. Schiller's main target of
criticism was the traditional philosophical account of
deductive logic according to which logic was a normative
science that could properly deem irrelevant how human
beings actually reasoned. Typical is the quotation from
Schiller that Frank included as the first of three quotations
before the title page of Law and the Modern Mind:
Whenever an attempt is made to point out that in every step in
actual thinking a person intervenes and directs the course of
thought in accordance with his interests and ideas, and that
therefore to understand the sequence and connection of thought
this fact must be taken into account, the cry is raised that this is
psychology, and an attack upon the dignity and integrity of logic.
It may be so but it does not follow that the fact can therefore be
disregarded.49
The problem with traditional logic, according to
Schiller, was that by focusing exclusively on the formal
structure of statements, it abstracted away from the
speaker's true meaning. 0 Such meaning, he said, depended
on the intent and purposes of the speaker, which could only
be gleaned from the context in which it was uttered."' And
the question of the meaning of a speaker's statement was
ultimately a psychological question because it depended on
"the whole of his concrete personality."" Schiller's influence
on Frank is evident. Frank quoted Schiller's statement that
..in every case of actual thinking .. , the whole of a man's
personality enters into and colors it in every part"'. in order
to show that the true causal determinants of judicial
decisions were not the syllogistic chain of reasoning in
69. FRANK, supra note 6, at tit. p.
70. SCHILLER, supra note 39, at 87 ("For the 'logical' context never recovers its
full concreteness, and so can never guarantee to 'Logic' a knowledge of the
actual meaning.").
7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 86 (emphasis omitted).
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which court opinions are framed, but rather the emotional
hunches of judges."3 If it was impossible for judges to reason
without their emotional reactions infecting their thinking-
even if only to provide the major and minor premises of a
syllogism-then for Frank, there was no good reason to
deem such psychological factors alien to legal reasoning."
The personal element was not only an essential
component of all reasoning, it was positively valuable in the
case of legal decision making. As we saw above, Frank
blamed the Myth for frustrating judges' capacity to do
justice in individual cases. Immediately after praising
judicial discretion, Frank recognized that while "[t]he
unavoidable intrusion of the judge's personality has its evil
aspects," he thought it preferable to at least acknowledge
the central role it played in resolving legal disputes." "The
judge is trying to decide what is just; his Judgment is a
'value judgment' and most judgments rest upon obscure
antecedents."" Indeed, relying on rules was nefarious
precisely because it encouraged the judge to ignore such
"obscure antecedents-the subjective elements of his
decision-in himself.77
At the same time, Frank considered such discretion to
be an essential element of law. Although he praised both
Aristotle and Roscoe Pound for defending the value of
"equitable" or discretionary decision making, he criticized
them both for suggesting that such decision making
somehow took place outside of law.7" Pound, for instance,
had described judicial discretion as "anti-legal" or "non-
legal" decision making, but Frank denied that one could
reasonably draw "a sharp cleavage between something
73. FRANK, supra note 6, at 111.
74. Of course, a defender of formal logic might well respond that even if a
person's emotions or interests determine the major and minor premises, such a
fact does not undermine the validity of the rules of logic that one then applies to
such premises. It is not entirely clear whether Schiller denies that point, but
what is clear is that Frank shared with Schiller a much greater interest in
discerning how people fill the content of their premises than in analyzing the
formal structure in which they place those premises. See id. at 66.
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id. at 143.
77. Id. at 131.
78. See id. at 139-41.
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which we call law and something which we call discretion.""9
And, in fact, "what Pound calls the non-legal is the
dominant, the more important, the more trulyr legal, for it is
found at the very core of the whole business."0O
If a judge's subjective emotions are not only part of all
human reasoning, but are also required for the wise and
just exercise of discretion, and if such discretion is an
essential component of law, then it would seem to follow
that the personal, subjective reactions of judges are
themselves part of the law. And indeed, that is precisely
what Frank argued. Appreciating the extent to which a
judge's decision depends on his subjective reactions to the
facts, Frank said, "must lead to a vision of law as something
more than rules and principles, must lead us again to the
opinion that the personality of the judge is the pivotal
factor.""' Thus, it is not that the judge's personality informs
the judge's view of the law, but rather that-since the law is
just judicial interpretations of its texts-the judge's
personality itself constitutes part of the law.
But what does it mean for the "personality" of a judge to
be constitutive of law? And is that even a plausible
conceptual claim about the nature of law? It certainly does
not seem consistent with a conventional positivist account,
or a natural law account, or even a Dworkinian-type
account that sees legal or moral principles as an essential
component of law. Whether a persuasive jurisprudential
account can be built on this idea is unclear, to say the least.
For one thing, it would seem to require drawing a
distinction between legitimate "personal reactions" by
judges and illegitimate ones, perhaps premised on some
notion of judicial virtue.8" Regardless, though, what seems
clearer is that Frank did not aim to provide a
philosophically sophisticated explication of the concept of
law. Rather, he sought to inquire into what law practically
meant for various participants in legal institutions. He at
one point noted that he was interested in what "the law
79. Id. at 140-41 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM.
L. REV. 20 (1905)).
80. Id. at 141.
81. Id. at 133.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 192-215 (discussing virtue theories of
adjudication).
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means to the average man of our times when he consults his
lawyer.""3 And he elsewhere considered law from the
standpoint of the legal reformer. Thus, Frank offered one
sure way to improve the predictability and certainty of case
outcomes:
If we were to elect or appoint to the bench the most narrow-
minded and bigoted members of the community, selected for their
adherence to certain relatively fixed and simple prejudices, willing
to be and remain ignorant of those niceties of difference between
individuals the apprehension of which makes for justice and
insensitivity to the rate of social change-we then might have
stability in the law. 84
In other words, Frank's claims about the nature of law
were made not in order to weigh in on conceptual debates
about the nature of law; rather, they were made with the
goal of pointing where to look if one wants to improve the
law. For Frank, the question of what the law is was more
fundamentally a question of who decides legal disputes.
Thus, if we care about the character of our law-about what
its aims and purposes are and how well it achieves those
aims and purposes-then we ought to look at the character of
the people settling those disputes. So that is the topic to
which he devotes most of the rest of his book.
III. THE DIAGNOSIS: EXPLAINING THE BASIC LEGAL MYTH
Frank's investigation of the legal mind required him
first to explain why lawyers and judges held this false belief
in legal certainty. The explanations Frank rejected are as
illuminating as the explanation he eventually settled on, for
they demonstrate nicely how Frank's epistemological
assumptions differed from those that have traditionally
been ascribed to him.85 Frank quickly ruled out as
83. FRANK, supra note 6, at 42. Leiter defends Frank and other Realists from
Hart's criticism on the same ground. See LEITER, supra note 3, at 71.
84. FRANK, supra note 6, at 133. Judge Richard Posner has recently made a
similar point: "[T]he more homogenous the judiciary, the more likely it is that
judges' intuitions will coincide. That will impart stability to the law, at the price
of epistemic weakness, as the judges' intuitions will rest on a narrower base of
unconscious knowledge." POSNER, supra note 11, at 116.
85. Chapters VII and X both discuss competing explanations, and in the first
Appendix, entitled "Other Explanations," Frank listed fourteen other possible
1148 Vol. 58
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insufficient the view that a "social want" for certainty in
adjudication explained the misperception that law was
definite and certain: "It provokes the further question, what
is back of this 'social want?' Why must law seem to be, what
it is not, a virtually complete set of commands?""
Frank then considered in far more depth an explanation
that blamed what he called "scholasticism." By this term he
meant to describe an intellectual habit of mind that
accorded undue significance to abstract terms and to the
concepts they purported to describe."7 Frank noted that this
explanation found support in the work of two influential
linguistic theorists. In their book The Meaning of Meaning,
C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards had argued that the obstacle
to clear thinking about any subject matter was our failure
to use words appropriately or to understand their proper
function." In primitive cultures, people held a false belief
that a word possessed a certain power over the thing to
which it referred." This belief that words had special
power-what Frank called "word- magic"-still affected
thinking and explained the impulse to invoke vague words
for their emotive power despite their failure to refer to
anything actually in the world.9 "
Frank found this hypothesis in many ways persuasive,
particularly since it seemed to explain analogous
intellectual vices in the realm of metaphysics and
epistemology. "Abstraction," he explained, "was the Jacob's-
ladder by which the philosopher ascended to certainty. The
further he was from the facts, the nearer he thought himself
to truth.""1 Instead of explaining the evil, chaos, and
messiness of the world, "wishful" metaphysicians such as
Plato sought to explain away such phenomena as mere
illusion, not "Reality."" They insisted that there was a
explanations, such as "the aesthetic impulse, ". .effect of professional habits," and
"inertia." See FRANK, supra note 6, at Ch. VII, Ch. X, App. I.
86. Id. at 11.
87. See id. at 63-65.
88. See generally C. K. OGDEN & 1. A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING
(8th ed. 1923); see also FRANK, supra note 6, at 84.
89. See FRANK, supra note 6, at 84.
90. Id. at 85.
91. Id. at 59.
92. Id. at 58-59.
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Reality behind the appearance, which they described with
words like "One, Eternal, Unchanging.""3 They would then
use "that instrument of reasoning which was worshipped by
all men of the Middle Ages-formal logic" to deduce further
conclusions from these very abstract metaphysical
concepts.~
If the Myth primarily reflected an undue emphasis on
abstract concepts and deductive reasoning, the appropriate
solution might seem obvious: apply the empiricist methods
that had proven so successful in the natural sciences to the
legal realm by observing and measuring the behavior of
judicial actors. This response would seem to be particularly
likely given the intellectual climate in which Frank wrote.
According to Professor Edward Purcell, during Frank's
time, "[t]he concept of science as method was crucial ...
[1]n an intellectual environment that rejected a priori
principles and cate7ories, method provided the one certainty
that was needed."9 Under the influence of positivist strains
of thought, philosophers would eventually insist that words
describing metaphysical or moral concepts were, strictly
speaking, meaningless. 96 And indeed, Ogden and Richards
had argued that the cure for "word-magic" in general lay in
being more precise with our language and in recognizing
that words were simplyj "Signs" that people used to stand for
observed phenomena. 9' Importantly, such Realists as Karl
Llewellyn and Leon Green made comparable critiques of
verbalism in the law.9
93. Id. at 59.
94. Id. at 64-65.
95. PURCELL. supra note 5, at 29.
96. See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 38-39 (1946)
("[It is the mark of a genuine factual proposition ... that some experiential
propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises
without being deducible from those other premises alone.").
97. OGDEN & RiCHARDS, supra note 88, at 10-11; see also PURCELL, supra note
5, at 48 (observing that the influence of logical positivism "reinforced the
arguments of Ogden and Richards").
98. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 431, 464 (1930) ("A clearer visualization" of the problems in legal theory
required "moves toward ever-decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-
increasing emphasis on observable behavior. .. ); see also FRANK, supra note 6,
at 57-58.
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Frank thought that this over-concern with words, and
the twin intellectual vices that it fostered-a privileging of
abstract concepts over observed phenomena and of
deductive logic over inductive reasoning-did indeed plague
legal thinking. But he ultimately rejected both the
scholastic explanation of the Myth and its implied solution.
He rejected the explanation because it was conclusory; what
he sought to know was why these methods had been
employed successfully in the realm of natural sciences and
not in the law."9 Are lawyers, he asked, "characterized by
unusual dullness, lack of shrewdness, blindness to the
minutiae of every day affairs?" Frank's answer: "Surely
not.""' 0 And he rejected the solution because it had been
falsified by experience: even those who practiced such
scientific methods suffered from what he perceived to be at
the heart of the Myth-the desire for certainty.
Frank offered an interesting example to illustrate his
point. According to Frank, Francis Bacon, the man more
associated with the "scientific method" than just about
anyone, had recognized the danger of letting our thoughts
be driven by the words we use. And he had rightly criticized
medieval philosophers for their refusal to recognize
observation as a chief source of knowledge."0 ' Nevertheless,
Frank argued, this fact "did not help Bacon to escape from
the most hampering characteristics of scholasticism: At the
basis of his 'scientific' method was the assumption that
'certainty at all costs and by the shortest route is the sole
aim of inquiry.""0 2 The problem was that Bacon "did not
develop a scientific, that is an adventurous, a risk-taking
type of mind." 0 '
For Frank, then, the source of the Myth was not just
excessive conceptualism-that itself was simply another
symptom. Rather, it was an emotional need or desire-the
desire for certainty in our knowledge of the world and how
it works.'0 4 And the key to the success of scientific inquiry
99. FRANK, supra note 6, at 68.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 89.90.
102. Id. at 90 (quoting F.C.S, SCHILLER, FORMAL LOGIC; A SCIENTIFIC AND
SOCIAL PROBLEM 259 (BiblioLife 2010) (1931)).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 97.
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had not only been the use of empirical, inductive methods
but also an overcoming of the desire for certainty itself. The
persistence of the Myth must thus somehow reflect an
incapacity or unwillingness on the part of lawyers and
judges to develop such a habit of mind-or at least to apply
it in the legal arena. But why does this require "a risk-
taking type of mind?" In answering this question, Frank
invoked a concept that proved crucial to the rest of his
argument: the fiction.
Drawing heavily on the work of German philosopher
Hans Vaihinger, Frank explained that a "fiction' was a
concept that one used with the conscious knowledge of its
falsity.'0 5 It was distinguished from a myth, which was false
but was believed by its exponent, and it was distinguished
from a lie, which was used in order to deceive others.' A
concept was a fiction when its exponent used it for a
legitimate theoretical or practical purpose, but did so
knowing that it was false.' The value of fictions lay in their
capacity to clarify thinking in a given domain or to enable
us to better conceptualize how to achieve certain goals. So,
for instance, the "completely healthy man," Frank
explained, was a fictitious concept because no such person
actually exists, but it is useful insofar as it aids medical
thinking about diseases and disorders.' 8 Indeed, Vaihinger
had argued that many of the concepts used in science,
philosophy, ethics, and economics ought properly be
understood as fictions. 0 Similarly, Frank argued that legal
rules and principles, too, were properly understood as
fictions."0 We should think of all rules the way we think of
those that deem business corporations to be persons for
certain purposes; we know that businesses are not literally
people, but we also recognize that it is sometimes useful to
105. Id. at 37.
106. Id.
107. Id; see also id. at app. VII, 312-22.
108. Id. at 37-38.
109. For Vaihinger, atoms were fictions, as were absolute space, Adam Smith's
notion of economic self-interest, and the Soul. VAIHINGER, supra note 39, at 184-
87, 213, 217-22, 227-233.
110. FRANK, supra note 6, at 166-67.
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treat the organization as an entity distinct from its
management or shareholders."'1
Fictions, Frank explained, were vital to intellectual
progress, but there was always a danger that a fiction could
become a myth."' 2 This occurred when those using the fiction
began to believe that the concept employed actually
described a feature of the objective world. 1 ' In fact,
according to both Frank and Vaihinger, it was
psychologically difficult to use fictions because it required
taking them seriously enough to have real practical
consequences depend on them, but not seriously enough to
believe that they actually mapped onto the world.' Frank
described this state of mind as one of "painful suspension"
in a chapter with that phrase as its title. 1 ' It was a mental
condition that resisted the pull toward a more comfortable
state of rest. "If an idea is accepted as objective, it has a.
stable equilibrium, whereas an hypothesis has an unstable.
one. The mind tends to make stable every psychical content
and to extend this stability, because the condition of
unstable mental equilibrium is uncomfortable.""'
This desire for mental "equilibrium" would, then, seem
to explain the desire for certainty reflected in the Myth.
Because it was psychologically painful to use legal rules and
principles to decide cases while simultaneously recognizing
their subjective nature, judges and lawyers subconsciously
convinced themselves that rules were objective, clear, and
certain. But where does this need for mental security or
"equilibrium" come from? According to Frank, Vaihinger
had believed it to be "natural,"' 7so for him overcoming it
111. Id. at 37-38.
112. Id. at 40.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 160-69; VAIHINGER, supra note 39, at xlv ("Naturally the human
mind is tormented by this insoluble contradiction between the world of motion
and the world of consciousness, and this torment can eventually become
oppressive.")
115. See FRANK, supra note 6, 40.
116. Id. at 162.
117. Id.
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required "a high degree of mental training; by the
production of a highly developed logical mind. . *""'8
Once again, though, Frank found such an explanation
wanting because it failed to usefully distinguish scientists
from lawyers. After all, both lawyers and scientists were
trained in analytical methods. "Yet there is one group of
human beings, the scientists, who apparently seek to avoid
that peace," Frank explained."' 9 "They go out in search of
disturbing problems. They provoke for themselves
situations which compel them to anguish themselves
recurrently with suspended choices, with the retention of an
open mind.""' The question for Frank, then, was why the
scientist, but not the lawyer, had "come to enjoy what the
psychologists tell us is painful." 2 '
To answer this question, Frank looked to child
psychology. The Myth and the desire for certainty it
reflected, he said, stemmed originally from the emotional
needs of the child.' According to the psychologist Jean
Piaget, children possessed a number of emotional attitudes
or modes of dealing with the world that reflected a deep
desire for stability and security. 2 ' From an early age,
children sought physical and emotional security, which
118. Id. at 163-64.
119. Id. at 160.
120. Id. Frank's characterization of scientific practice may have been as
unrealistically romantic as his view of legal practice was bleak. Thomas Kuhn,
for one, took a dimmer view:
The scientific enterprise as a whole does from time to time prove useful,
open up new territory, display order, and test long-accepted belief.
Nevertheless, the individual engaged on a normal research problem is
almost never doing any one of these things. Once engaged, his
motivation is of a rather different sort. What then challenges him is the
conviction that, if only he is skillful enough, he will succeed in solving a
puzzle that no one has solved or solved so well . . .. If it is to classify as
a puzzle, a problem must be characterized by more than an assured
solution. There must also be rules that limit both the nature of
acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained.
THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 38 (2d ed. 1970).
121. FRANK, supra note 6, at 161.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id. at 13-14; see generally JEAN PIAGET, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF
THE CHILD (Marjorie Warden trans., 1926).
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their parents were quick to provide for them.' The parents
were thus p erceived by the child to be "all-powerful, all-
knowing. "12 And whereas the child's mother offered him
"'.domestic tenderness,"' the father had to "'adopt the
position of the final arbiter in force and authority.""" He
thus personified "all that is certain, secure, infallible, and
embodie[d] exact law-making." 27 Eventually, of course, the
child realized that the father was not all-knowing or all-
powerful, but he still found it hard to face a life that was
unpredictable and full of uncertainty and chance, so he
sought substitutes for this father figure.' Frank's
hypothesis was that the law served well as such a father-
substitute, with the result that this unconscious longing for
fatherly authority manifested itself in the desire for legal
certainty.12' Hence, the Basic Legal Myth.'
In this account, Frank believed, we finally had an
explanation of the Myth that successfully illustrated why
lawyers treat law differently than natural scientists treat
the natural world: "'.Scholasticism' has survived in
lawyerdom while it is on the wane among natural scientists
because the emotional attitudes of childhood have a more
tenacious hold on men when their thinking is directed
towards the law than when they are thinking about the
natural sciences . * ""' The sciences were "not so easily as
law converted into a father- substitute."112 In other words,
what explained the difference in relative success between
natural scientists and jurists was not that the scientists
discovered real, objective facts about the world whereas the
jurists arbitrarily drew lines in a world of indeterminate
values. Rather, it was that the impulse to cling dogmatically
to generalizations about the world was simply stronger in
124. Id.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. at 15 (quoting BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, SEX AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE
SOCIETY 257, 259 (1927)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 14-15.
129. Id. at 18-21.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 82.
132. Id.
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law than in science because the law dealt with situations
that more closely resembled those from our childhood, when
we craved certainty. 3 3
What are we to make of Frank's speculations about
childhood longings and father- substitutes? Some scholars
have interpreted Frank more or less literally as making an
empirical claim about precisely how a belief in legal
certainty arose in the minds of lawyers and judges. Finding
the theory outdated and empirically unsupported, they then
dismiss it as superfluous to Frank's core claims."' The
reading is in some ways charitable, but the problem is that
Frank devoted a substantial portion of the book to ruling
out other explanations and to describing the father-
substitution theory, so it is hard not to think that something
significant about his argument is lost if it is so easily cast
aside.
But it may be that Frank did not intend to make such a
strong empirical claim at all. If, as we have seen, Frank
insisted that all thinking was driven by purposes and
values, perhaps Frank's father-figure explanation is best
understood as an effort to serve Frank's own rhetorical
purposes, namely to show the value of, and need for, the
skeptical attitude he advanced. Indeed, I think this is so.
Frank's account of the "child's world" essentially served as a
foil with which he could contrast the "adult" or "modern"
mind he thought so crucial to intellectual progress. To be
133. Nor were scientists entirely immune from such longings. In an appendix,
Frank expressed skepticism that science could provide objectively true and
absolute answers to questions about what the world was like. See id. app. 111, at
285-88. He thus described as an "unscientific conception of science" the view
that science offered "a charter of certainty, a technique which ere long will give
man complete control and sovereignty over nature." Id. app. III, at 285. The
reason was that science was itself a human enterprise and was, like all
knowledge, restricted by the limits of the human mind. The universe, therefore,
"will always contain some remnant of what, humanly speaking, is chaos,
something which refuses to be reduced to our conception of order, something
astray which cannot be formulated in terms of 'scientific laws."' Id. app. 111, at
287. The world as described by "popular science" is, according to Frank, "a
child's world, a dream world." -Id. app. 111, at 288.
134. See SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 130-31; Llewellyn, Adler & Cook, supra
note 13, at 82-90 (Llewellyn's contribution); see also FRANK 2009, supra note
23.
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sure, Frank thought there was some rough causal
connection between the emotional attitudes of the young
and a yearning for legal certainty. And indeed, he may have
been justified in doing so, for the thought is hardlyT
implausible and is still taken seriously by psychologists."'5
But the point is that the contrast in mental outlook itself,
not the particular "father- substitution" theory, does the
important work in Frank's argument.
This reading requires justification, but a few reasons in
support of it can be offered. First, Frank explicitly qualified
his account in the text itself, saying repeatedly that his was
only a "partial explanation," and at one point explicitly
"absolv[ing] from responsibility" Piaget for the inferences
drawn from his work, which, Frank said, he had juxtaposed
with his own interpretations "to suit the writer's own
purposes."" Second, such a reading is consistent with his
endorsement of the use of "fictions" noted above."' 7 Recall
that according to Vaihinger, a fiction refers to a concept that
is known to be false. It treats something "as if' it had one or
another property. The theoretical value of fictions is
measured not by how well the fictions correspond with
reality-since they do not correspond to any reality-but
rather by the fruits of the theoretical or practical enterprise,
in which it is put to use."' 8
But if we think of Frank's father- substitute theory of
the Myth as a "fiction," the question then becomes, what
purpose does it serve as a fiction? What is its function as an
explanation for the Myth? Answering these questions is the
final and most important justification for this
interpretation. Thus, below I seek to show how Frank's
135. See, e.g., Detlef Oesterreich, Flight into Security: A New Approach and
Measure of the Authoritarian Personality, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 275, 282 (2005)
(describing the concept of an "authoritarian reaction" as one that seeks comfort
and security and noting that the child's flight towards their parents is an early
instance of such a reaction).
136. FRANK, supra note 6, at 69 n. For some examples of Frank's repeated
assertions that his was only a "partial explanation," see id. at 20, app. 1, at 263.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 105-16.
138. See VAIHINGER, supra note 39, at 99 ("For us the essential element in a
fiction is not the fact of its being a conscious deviation from reality, a mere piece
of imagination-but we stress the useful nature of this deviation."). Frank made
explicit in later editions his desire that his father figure explanation be
interpreted as a fiction. See FRANK 1963, supra note 65, at 23 n.8.
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speculations on child development illuminate a type of
philosophical disposition or stance toward the world-what
he called the "scientific spirit"-that Frank thought
necessary to improve legal thought and practice.
IV. THE REMEDY: CULTI-VATING THE "SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT"
Given scholars' tendency to describe Frank as an
"9extreme" Realist and the large amount of attention paid to
his speculations about child psychology, one might think
that the "modern mind" of his book's title was meant to
describe an irrational mind-one pulled in different
directions by conflicting impulses and emotional drives. In
fact, the opposite is the case. For Frank, the "modern mind"
was one "free of childish emotional drags, a mature mind."139
It was imbued with what Frank called the "scientific
spirit."' And the remedy for the ills caused by the Myth
was to cultivate the "scientific spirit" in lawyers and
judges.'4 ' Frank's discussion of the "scientific spirit"-of how
and why it should be cultivated-thus reveals his deepest
jurisprudential concerns.
What exactly is the "scientific spirit"? Frank gives the
reader the first indication in a chapter entitled "Scientific
Training" about halfway through the first and main part of
the book.' There he considered Walter Wheeler Cook's
proposal that lawyers be taught the "logic of the natural
sciences."' 3 Frank was far less sanguine than Cook about
its prospects for achieving progress in legal practice or
theory. His skepticism was based on previous attempts to
apply the methods of science to the law. In the eighteenth
century, for instance, mathematics had "aided creative
work" in physics and chemistry and was "progressive,
reconstructive, restless ... adventurous, incessantly
cuiu." Not so in legal science. There, "[n]ot novelty, but
fixity, was the goal. Certainty, stability, rigidity were to be
139. FRANK, supra note 6, at 252 (emphasis omitted).
140. Id. at 98.
141. Id. at 98-99.
142. See id. at 93-99.
143. Id. at 93.
144. Id. at 95.
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procured by reason."" Similarly in the nineteenth century,
jurists co-opted the language of "induction" from natural
scientists, but it only further served to "worship an
' invisible law."""6 Thus, Frank said that rather than teach
lawyers the scientific method, he hoped to foster in them:
the spirit of the creative scientist, which yearns not for safety but
risk, not for certainty but adventure, which thrives on
experimentation, invention and novelty and not on nostalgia for
the absolute, which devotes itself to new ways of manipulating
protean particulars and not to the quest of undeviating
universals.14 7
Here we see Frank describe precisely the same
characteristic that he claimed Bacon, the father of
empiricism, had lacked.4 4' The relevant question for Frank
was how such a spirit could be cultivated. "Can the
scientific spirit be inculcated by instruction in the ways of
the scientists? It would seem not."14 1 It did not require, he
said, "formal education." 0 The reason for lawyers' failure to
develop this type of adventurous mind was not "dull-
mindedness." It was because the law possessed the power to
"6excite a spirit of devotion to fatherly authority.""' It was, in
other words, an "emotional blocking due to the very
character of law" that made lawyers continue their "childish
habits of thinking" by craving legal certainty.'
We can now begin to see clearly how Frank used his
account of the "child's mind" to frame what he took to be the
principal intellectual vices behind the Myth. Whereas the
145. Id. at 96.
146. Id. at 97. Once again. Frank's picture is somewhat of a caricature. At
least some legal theorists in the nineteenth century took seriously the
comparison to science in thinking that its methods could be used for the purpose
of discovering and improving, rather than merely fixing, the law. See generally
Charles L. Barzun, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REV. 1051
(2004).
147. FRANK, supra note 6, at 98 (emphasis omitted).
148. Id. at 90.
149. Id. at 98.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 99.
152. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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child's mind craved comfort and security,' the adult
mind-the modern mind, the scientific mind-celebrated
risk and adventure;' whereas the child sought
explanations for events,' the adult mind was comfortable
with chance and contingency;' whereas the child would not
ccassume a hypothesis unless you can force him to believe it,"
for one imbued with the "scientific spirit," suspended
judgment was a "source of pleasure, not of pain";' and
whereas the child was "singularly non-introspective" and
had "no curiosity about the motives that guide his
thinking," the modern mind is one that undertook
"searching self-analysis" and "ventures of self- discovery."158
Thus, although the child would "regard his own perspective
as immediately objective and absolute,"' the modern mind
recognized the subjectivity of its own judgments.6 0 Clearly,
then, Frank did not use the word "adult" in any
conventional sense; rather, it described a particular kind of
intellectual or philosophical achievement.
More important, as any good fiction must, the father-
substitute theory also served the function of explaining two
features of the "scientific spirit" that were crucial if it was to
serve the jurisprudential role Frank hoped for it. First, as
we have already seen, it described an emotional capacity,
not a purely analytical one. The emotional component was
key because, Frank believed, the emotions played an
important role in shaping our ideals, values, and notions of
justice. "[Tlhe judge should not be a mere thinking-
machine," he insisted.'6 ' He clarified that he did not
advocate a "'.hard-boiled' matter-of-factness,'" nor did he
discount the value of "ideals" in the law.16 2 Indeed, Frank
made clear that he believed "[t]here can be . .. a 'scientific
153. Id. at 16.
154. See id. at 98.
155. Id. at 72.
156. See id. at 17-18.
157. Id. at 164-66.
158. Id. at 114-17.
159. Id. at 77.
160. See id. at 161-62.
161. Id. at 147 & n.
162. Id. at 168.
1160 Vol. 58
210] FRANK AND THE MODERN MIND 16
character to questions as to what the law ought to be."' 16 1
Imagination and idealistic speculation were not the
problem. Rather, the key was to develop the right kind of
imagination-not the "compensatory, castle-in-the-air kind
of imagining," that merely sought escape from reality, but
rather a "creative, inventive phantasy [sic], projecting in
imagination possibly useful rearrangements of
experience." Frank hoped to cultivate a "more constructive
type of speculating."' We needed judges "'.with a touch in
them of the qualities which make poets,' who will
administer justice as an art," so we should "encourage, not
to discountenance, imagination, intuition, insight. "16 After
all, what lawyers and judges think the law ought to be
"constitutes, rightfully, no small part of the thinking of
lawyers and judges. Such thinking should not be
diminished, but augmented." 67
The second feature of the "scientific spirit" that Frank's
father- substitute "fiction" usefully accounted for was that it
could be developed-not just by those with particular
intellectual talents, but by anyone willing to give it the
effort. All it required was some rigorous introspection.
Judges, he said, must "come to grips with the human nature
operative in themselves."6 6' The judge must thus become a
psychologist who studied his own personality "so that he
might become keenly aware of his own prejudices, biases,
antipathies, and the like."'66' This is what the child is unable
to do. Recall that for Frank, legal decisions entailed value
judgments, and such judgments rested on "obscure
antecedents. 7
Obscure, but not arbitrary. Through careful
introspection, the judge could discern which of his
"subjective reactions" were appropriately triggered by the
163. Id. (quoting MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 188 (1967)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 169 (quoting GRAHAm WALLi~s, OUR SOCIAL HERITAGE 194 (1921)).
167. Id. at 168.
168. Id. at 147.
169. Id. at 147 n.
170. Id. at 143.
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facts of the case-by the injustice done to a civil plaintiff, for
instance-and which were the result of some arbitrary
prejudice or bias. The key to reform was thus not
observation of judicial behavior, but rather for judges
themselves to engage in individual introspection as to their
own thoughts, feelings, beliefs, purposes, goals, and
assumptions. The skill required was both emotional and
analytical. It was emotional in that it required a certain
sensitivity to one's own felt reactions to a set of legal facts.
And it was analytical because it required isolating that
reaction and comparing it to how one reacted to previous
comparable situations in order to distinguish the
appropriately stimulated emotions from the arbitrary biases
and prejudices.'7 ' If Frank's faith in introspection and self-
scrutiny as a means of achieving legal reform owes in part
to his own experience in psychoanalysis, it makes this
reading all the more plausible. For if Frank had undergone
what was conventionally labeled a "psychological" or
"emotional" form of analysis and yet come out of it with a
conviction that he saw his own life and the choices he faced
in a clearer way and made better decisions as a result, it is
easy to see how he would find it difficult to distinguish the
rational from the emotional component."' 2
It is not an overstatement to say that for Frank,
developing the "scientific spirit" in oneself was akin to a
religious conversion after which one attained a kind of
171. Id. at 122-25.
172. Frank would thus passionately deny that he was substituting emotion for
reason, or will for intellect, a charge some scholars have leveled. See ANTHONY T.
KRoNmAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 191
(1993) ("Frank's attack on Langdell's science of law thus begins by substituting
will for reason as the key faculty in adjudication."); vOLKOMER, Supra note 22, at
218 ("From this cursory inquiry into Frank's psychological make-up it can be
tentatively stated that the origins of much of Jerome Frank's political thought
were emotional and not rational."). Instead, Frank would have joined Schiller in
dismissing the will/reason distinction as one based on an outdated conception of
the human mind:
The analysis of psychic process into 'thinking', 'willing,' and 'feeling,' in
order to justify the restriction of 'Logic' to the first and the exclusion of
the two latter, appears to be an unwarranted piece of amateur
psychologising. For the analysis in question is valuable only as a rough
reference for popular purposes, and is really a survival from the old
'faculty' psychology.
SCHILLER, supra note 39, at 98-99.
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heightened consciousness. The craving for certainty
resembled a sleep from which one eventually woke up and
saw "everything as transitory" and so "welcome [d] of new
doubts."' He envisioned the modern, mature judge as one
who "positively enjoys a state of mind in which he is not at
rest, in which there is a struggle of many persons within
him, and in which he arrives at judgments as the result of
prolonged and wakeful combat between opposing
possibilities."' Once he cultivated this capacity for
'' wakeful combat" within himself he saw things with clearer
vision. Specifically, he understood that legal rules and
principles were not "finalities" but rather "shorthand
expressions, ingenious abbreviations, metaphors, shortcuts,
figures of thought, intellectual scaffoldings, and the like."'
In other words, he understood that for the judge, legal rules
and concepts like negligence and due process, just as the
concept of economic self-interest was for economists, were
useful fictions or "as-ifs," whose value lay in their
theoretical and practical payoff, which, in the case of law,
meant facilitating just decision making.' Once he had
given up the dream of perfect fidelity to the past and control
of the future, he could focus on doing justice in the present.
Such a judge would have finally learned "the virtue, the
power and the practical worth of self- authority" that slavish
adherence to rules had thus far prevented judges from
developing.' The cure for the ills produced by the Myth
173. FRANK, supra note 6, at 166.
174. Id. Posner, on the other hand, criticized legal formalism for placing
unrealistic demands on judges, "who in our system should often have the
uncomfortable feeling of skating on thin ice without the luxury of being able to
defer decisions until certitude descends on them." POSNER, supra note 11, at
249.
175. FRANK, supra note 6, at 166.
176. Id. at 167.
177. Id. at 121. One can see in such descriptions support for Horwitz's
characterization of Law and the Modern Mind as "existentialist." HORWITZ,
supra note 19, at 176-77. Frank's emphasis on the need for judges to accept the
uncertainty of their situation and to take responsibility for their decisions
resembles at least one strain of existentialist thought. One can imagine, for
instance, Frank agreeing with Jean Paul Sartre that when facing ethical
dilemmas, "[ilf values are vague, and if they are always too broad for the
concrete and specific case that we are considering, the only thing left for us is to
trust our instincts." JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS
26 (Bernard Fretchman, trans. 1957). But it is not clear that Frank would follow
16320101
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thus lay in developing a judiciary filled with judges infused
with the "scientific spirit." He envisioned a world in which
judges were developed from "the more enlightened,
sensitive, intelligent members of the community.""' 8 The
decisions of such judges would not be uniform, because not
all judges would "react identically to a given set of
circumstances or will be obtuse to the recognition of unique
facts in particular legal controversies.""7 ' But, having given
up the dream of perfect predictability ourselves, we will no
longer crave it. Furthermore, "[i]n a deeper sense," Frank
explained:
[U]niformity of point of view among judges is likely to increase to
the extent that judges are the more enlightened, the more quick to
detect and hold in check their own prejudices, the more alive to
the fact that rules and precedents are not their masters but
merely agencies to be utilized in the interest of doing justice.
He had in mind "such judges as Holmes, Cardozo,
Hutcheson, Lehman and Cuthbert Pound."' 8 0
Of course, a deep tension runs through this account. For
there is all the difference in the world between saying that
judges will justifiably decide cases differently on the same
set of facts and saying that case outcomes will vary because
judges will be attuned to the subtle factual and legal
distinctions among cases. The former implies that there is
no single, determinate "right answer" to most cases,
whereas the latter implies that there is a single right
answer, but that it depends on the unique facts of each case.
This leaves the meaning of the "deeper" certainty Frank
imagined somewhat ambiguous. Does the certainty lie in
the fact that justice has been done in each case, even if we
Sartre in concluding that "[tlhe only way to determine the value of [a feeling or
instinct] is, precisely, to perform an act which confirms and defines it." Id. at 27.
For even this view seems to assume a strong distinction between fact and value,
which Frank rejected. According to Sartre, the absence of God meant that the
"possibility of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappears along with him," id.
at 22, but for Frank, as we have seen, ethical or legal decisions were not acts of
pure will-they had an ineliminable epistemic component and could thus be
improved through careful introspection and cultivation of the proper intellectual
habits.
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cannot describe the outcomes using an easily generalizable
rule? Or is it that there is uniformity simply in the judges'
(correct) "point of view" that there is no single right outcome
of most legal disputes? On this point, Frank does not offer a
clear answer.
Frank concluded Law and the Modern Mind with one of
his most famously entitled chapters, "Mr. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the Completely Adult Jurist."8 ' Frank's
treatment of Holmes as a model Jurist may at first seem in
tension with his praise of the value of ideals and
imagination in the law. But it was not the cynical side of
Holmes that Frank revered.' He nowhere endorsed
Holmes's desire to wash moral notions from the law with
"cynical acid."8  Instead, much of what he admired in
Holmes were fairly moderate-if "realist"-judicial virtues:
Holmes's respect for the utility of logic, along with his
recognition that it was often insufficient to decide cases; his
deference to, but not enslavement by, history and precedent;
and his recognition that ultimately the aim of law was to
serve the needs of society.'
Not surprisingly, what Frank most praised about
Holmes was his skepticism. But Frank clarified that it was
a constructive, not cynical, skepticism."'I Here again, Frank
drew on Vaihinger, who had noted that the ancient Greek
skeptics fell into a state of despair when the 7"realized the
deep chasm between thought and reality."" ~Such despair
was understandable, Vaihinger explained, because ..mere
subjective thinking' had not 'yet achieved these tremendous
scientific feats which are distinctive of modern times." 8 7
According to Frank, the situation is comparable to that of
jurists today. They wither at the "subjectivity" of the law
and its apparent implications, but they do so needlessly.
181. Id. at 253.
182. For the many different interpretations of Holmes, see WHITE, supra note
31, at 194-226. White observes that Holmes was elevated to "demigod" status in
the 1930s. Id. at 210. That characterization seems accurate in the case of Frank.
183. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HA~v. L. REv. 457,
462 (1897).
184. See FRANK, supra note 6, at 253-55.
185. See id. at 255, 259.
186. Id. at 259.
187. Id. (quoting VAIHINGER, supra note 39, at 136).
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Just as scientists have been able to employ such fictions as
electrons and atoms to construct plausible accounts of the
natural world that enable us to manipulate it in useful
ways, so too should lawyers feel confident in their capacity
to use the fictions of law-its rules, standards, and
principles-for the purpose of securing justice in each case.
According to Frank, Holmes exemplified this capacity to see
"the relative nature of all human thought- contrivances. 18 8
Maintaining this attitude in the law required even more
courage than it did in science because it had already proven
its worth in science. But Holmes showed that it could be
done in law as well. 189
That is roughly what Frank meant by the term
"6scientific spirit," which he offered as a remedy for the
harms caused by the Myth. Commentators, however, have
been uniformly unimpressed by it and deny that it amounts
to a constructive vision for legal reform.' Why? It depends,
I suppose, on what one means by that criticism. If one
means that Frank failed to offer a "substantive theory about
the good society," then the charge seems fair.' 91 He did not
propose criteria for allocating resources within society, nor
for determining what purposes governments ought to
pursue. Nor did he lay out strategies for using the social
sciences as tools to solve concrete problems of public policy.
But those were not his aims. Law and the Modern Mind is a
book about the adjudication of legal disputes. And in it he
presented an argument that (1) encouraged judges to treat
the primary materials used for settling disputes in a
radically different way (at least to his mind) than they had
been treated previously, (2) offered a philosophical
justification for such a shift, and (3) provided guidance as to
how to bring about that change in attitude towards legal
materials. In other words, Frank offered a normative theory
of adjudication. Now his theory may have been deficient in a
number of respects, but it is important to at least see what
he was trying to do.
188. Id. at 259-60.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 24.
191i. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 125 (noting Frank's failure to develop such a
theory).
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To this end, it may be helpful to see that today we
would probably call Frank's account a "virtue" theory of
adjudication. In the past several decades, philosophers have
developed normative accounts in political theory,~ ethics, 9 3
epistemology,"' 4 and jurisprudence' 95 based on the notion of
human virtue or excellence. Virtue theories vary widely, but
they typically share certain core features. First, the turn to
virtue theory reflects a general aversion to legalistic or rule-
based approaches to the relevant field. Thus, virtue-based
approaches to analyzing particular epistemological, ethical,
or jurisprudential problems tend to be highly particularized
and context- sensitive.' Second, and most obviously, they
all see human virtues-that is, qualities of mind and
character-as the starting point of normative inquiry in
their respective domains." In ethical theory, for instance,
192. See generally, e.g., ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (1981).
193. See generally, e.g., VIRTUE ETHICS (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds.,
1997). The classic article in this area is G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral
Philosophy, 33 J. ROYAL INST. PHIL. 1 (1958).
194. E.g. LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI, VIRTUES OF THE MIND: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE AND THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996).
195. Lawrence Solum has thus far developed the most sophisticated virtue-
based account of legal adjudication. Solum defines judicial virtue as "a naturally
possible disposition of mind or will that when present with the other judicial
virtues reliably disposes its possessor to make just decisions." Lawrence B.
Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 198 (2003). One such virtue, for instance, is a disposition
to fairness, which is "constituted in part by having the right sort of emotional
equipment for sympathy, an appropriate, even-handed concern for the interests
of others." Id. at 197. Having the right "emotional equipment" is crucial because
just decisions at some point depend on a judges' inarticulable sense of how he or
she "sees" the case. Id. at 201; cf. FRANK, supra note 6, at 143 ('The judge is
trying to decide what is just; his judgment is a 'value judgment' and most value
judgments rest upon obscure antecedents."). Like other virtue theorists, Solum
defines the good sought after by reference to the human capacity necessary for
its attainment. Thus, according to Solum, "the notion of a just decision cannot
be untangled from the notion of a virtuous judge grasping the salient features of
the case. Virtue, in particular the virtue of phronesis, or judicial wisdom, is a
central and ineliminable part of the story." Solum, supra, at 202. For a collection
of essays using the concept of virtue to analyze various legal topics, see VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008).
196. See VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 193, at 3.
197. See id. Linda Zagzebski's definition of virtue is typical: "[A] deep and
enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation
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philosophers have argued that we can get a better grip on
what an ethical life entails by looking to particular virtues,
such as courage, humility, and generosity, rather than by
looking to abstract principles of justice or utility."'8 In
epistemology, relevant virtues might include, among others,
diligence, care, open-mindedness, sensitivity to salient facts
and intellectual humility."9 9 Finally, many of the most
important virtues, especially that of phronesis or
"judgment," are seen to be both moral and intellectual
virtues, which depend on emotional and rational faculties. 00
It is not hard to see how Frank's account amounts to a
virtue theory of adjudication. First, Frank's entire book is
one long, sustained attack on the legalistic, rule-centered
mode of legal reasoning, and he is quite explicit in his
demand for individualized and particularized judgments. 0 1
Second, as we saw above, the emphasis he placed on the
judicial "personality" demonstrates clearly that he saw
human qualities and capacities as the relevant subject of
analysis and that he thought possession of such virtues
necessary for the just adjudication of legal disputes. Finally,
the virtue-or set of virtues-he prized above all others, the
"4scientific spirit," has both an intellectual and moral
component. He insisted that it was ultimately an "emotional
attitude," and one that required a type of courage and
acceptance of responsibility (moral); 02 at the same time,
though, it entailed adopting a particular philosophical
perspective about the limited nature of human knowledge
(intellectual).
This last point warrants special emphasis, because it
responds to an obvious sort of objection to the interpretation
I have been offering. The conventional view has been to see
the transformation Frank envisioned as mostly the negative
to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that
end." ZAGZEBSKI, supra note 194, at 137.
198. See Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 193, at
163-77.
199. ZAGZEBSRJ, supra, note 194, at 114.
200. See ZAGZEBSKI, supra note 158, at 148 (noting that such virtues as
"[cjuriosity, doubt, wonder, and awe" seem to be both intellectual and moral
virtues); Foot, supra note 198, at 164.
201. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 6, at 55.
202. Id. at 98-99.
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one of throwing off various prejudices-a process of
"liberation.""' 3 Frank's use of the language of psychotherapy,
which is often seen as a process of "uncovering" neuroses or
prejudices, gives some support to this characterization and
probably explains its appeal. 0 ' Under this view, it would be
perverse to call Frank's a "virtue theory," because he offers
no substantive virtues. Far more plausible would be to
characterize Frank as a legal pragmatist of the sort Judge
Richard Posner praises."0 '
To be sure, Frank was indeed a legal pragmatist, but
one advantage of framing his view as a kind of virtue theory
is to emphasize the extent to which any plausible normative
theory of adjudication calling itself pragmatist depends on
some conception of judicial virtue. For if the legal
pragmatist not only means to accept but to affirmatively
endorse the view that judges make decisions on the basis of
their own prior experience, hunches, and intuitions, then
one might fairly demand some kind of account as to what
intellectual or emotional capacities well suit them to the
task."'6
And Frank did just that. In both its moral and epistemic
dimensions, the "scientific spirit" has real content. First, the
virtue of courage is included on most traditional accounts of
203. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 172, at 193 ("Liberated by his self-
understanding, the mature judge stands ready to meet the real, and
unavoidable, tragedies of life.").
204. Not surprisingly, Frank largely abandoned this way of framing the issue
in his later work.
205. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 230-65.
206. Hence, Judge Posner describes the legal pragmatist approach as "a
nondoctrinaire, open-minded, experimentalist approach to law and public
policy," id. at 232, and, at another point, takes law professors to task for failing
to devote attention to subject of judicial character:
Ours remains a case law system, and judges are central players in such a
system. But because few law professors are interested any longer in
trying to understand what makes judges tick or in trying to improve the
judicial ticker . .. academic discussion of judicial opinions rarely even
identifies the judges whose opinions are being discussed. ....
Id. at 218-19. 1 hope to have shown that Frank was primarily concerned with
"improv[ing] the judicial ticker."
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ethical virtues,"' 7 and Frank made quite clear that what he
was demanding was a form of courage. Of course, the
courage Frank had in mind was not physical courage, but
rather a kind of moral or philosophical daring. It required
making legal decisions, which depend largely on one's
inchoate intuitions, in the face of deep uncertainty. One
infused with the "scientific spirit," he said, "yearns not for
safety but risk, not for certainty but adventure.Y2 0 8 And
maintaining this skeptical spirit "requires courage more
courage than is required in the natural sciences. "204 True,
Frank did not offer much in the way of substantive criteria
to determine what counts as courageous judicial action and
what does not, but the whole point of virtue-centered
theories is to deny that such explicit criteria can be
provided. Instead, we learn about courageous actions by
looking to the actions of courageous people.
The same is true of the epistemic side of the "scientific
spirit." It is not that one simply becomes aware of one's
prejudices and is magically no longer affected by them.
Rather, one must adopt a particular stance towards one's
own beliefs-to view them with critical distance without
abandoning them completely. Recall that Frank thought the
emotions played a central role in all legal decision making,
whether just or unjust. The key, then, was not simply to
overcome one's prejudices but to develop the right ones-the
ones that reflect the values in the law relevant to the facts
at hand. "The best we can hope for," Frank said, "is that the
emotions of the judge will become more sensitive , more
nicely balanced, more subject to his own scrutiny, more
capable of detailed articulation. 0
Even if Frank advocated the cultivation of substantive
judicial virtues, it may still be objected that they are not
precise enough to determine how judges should decide
particular cases. And this deficit might render Frank's
theory of adjudication not only impractical but
207. Foot, supra note 198, at 169; cf. Solum, supra note 195, at 189 (including
"judicial courage" among the judicial virtues).
208. FRANK, supra note 6, at 98.
209. Id. at 260.
210. Id. at 143.
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illegitimate."'1 The point is fair insofar as it accuses Frank
of failing to offer any sort of decision procedure for deciding
cases. He offered no such thing, believing it to be
impossible. But the relationship between legal determinacy
and moral justification is a philosophically controversial
one." 2 It also does not render Frank's theory irrational or
self-defeating that it cannot alone decide concrete cases. 1 '
Furthermore, there is at least one class of cases in which
Frank's approach would likely yield predictable results,
namely those in which applying a rule does not fulfill its
underlying rationale. Professor Fred Schauer, for instance,
has argued that the essence of legal reasoning consists in
applying the rule anyway in such cases, but Frank's view
implies that in such cases the rule should be discarded as
soon as its rationale gives way. 2 14
A more persuasive objection is that Frank's substantive
conception of judicial virtue, which encouraged judges to
treat rules as merely instruments for meting out justice to
the individual parties, left virtually no space for traditional
rule-of-law values, such as predictability, stability, and
formal equality.2 5 But making that argument confirms the
central thesis of this essay, for it requires engaging in
precisely the kind of normative debate to which scholars
deny that Frank even attempted to contribute.
211. For an argument that a theory cannot morally justify an outcome it does
not determine, see Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification,
48 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1773 (2007).
212. Compare Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing
Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987), with RONALD DWORKIN, MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985).
213. See Frederick Schauer, Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining
Role of Legal Text, 4 L. & ETHICS Hum. RTS. 33 (2010) (noting that unconstrained
legal decision making is not necessarily irrational decision making).
214. See SCHAUIER, supra note 23, at 7 ('ilElvery one of the dominant
characteristics of legal reasoning and legal argument can be seen as a route
toward reaching a decision other than the best all-things-considered-decision for
the matter at hand." (emphasis omitted)).
215. Indeed, Solum makes for a useful contrast on this front because he
includes respect for the stability and coherence of the law as a key judicial
virtue. Solum, supra note 195, at 197.
1712010]
1172~ BUFFALO0 LA W RE VIEW [o.5
CONCLUSION
I began this Article by situating Frank within a
philosophical debate about the status of human values in a
non-theological conception of the world. There I
distinguished "scientific naturalists," who insisted upon a
clear fact-value dichotomy, from a group of thinkers and
philosophers-plausibly dubbed "tpragmatists" or
"humanists"-who denied that committing oneself to an
empiricist epistemology ruled out rational debate about
religious, ethical, or aesthetic values. Most scholars have
characterized Frank as a conventional scientific naturalist,
and in Law and the Modern Mind, Frank gave them much
evidence to support that characterization, not the least of
which was his repeated invocation of a particular theory of
child psychology. Still, I have sought to show that the
overall structure of his argument (not to mention the
philosophical sources he relies on) demonstrates that he
was far more sympathetic to this latter school of thought,
which rejected strong dichotomies between fact and value,
reason and emotion, philosophy and psychology. And once
we understand him to have held such philosophical
assumptions, we can see that his psychological explanation
of the Basic Legal Myth did not necessarily imply
irrationalism and that his skepticism about predicting case
outcomes did not mean that he failed to give any guidance
for legal reform.
If this interpretation of Law and the Modern Mind has
been persuasive, my hope is that it will prompt not only a
reevaluation of Frank's contribution to legal theory but a
reexamination of Legal Realism itself. As mentioned at the
outset, the themes discussed in this Article-from Frank's
skepticism about the utility of using social- scientific
methods to study law, to his concern with the education and
training of judges, to the importance of cultivating the
"4scientific spirit" in judges and legal scholars-became only
more pronounced in his later work."' 6 Frank never denied
the value of the empirical study of judicial behavior, but as
we have seen, he was far more concerned with the value of
introspection than with empirical observation. He was less
concerned with measuring judicial prejudices and biases
216. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1950); JEROME FRANK, FATE &
FREEDOM (1945).
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than he was with overcoming them. It is thus perhaps not
surprising that as the legal academy has become more
enamored with the prospect of applying empirical methods
to legal institutions, scholars have tended to focus on the
empiricist aspirations of the Realists as a whole, while
dismissing Frank's contributions as idiosyncratic and
peripheral to the core of Realist thought. 17
But there are grounds for hope. Recently, scholars of
various stripes have once again become interested in
studying the personality and character of judges."' So it
may be that the Legal Realist for whom that topic remained
front and center will again get the attention that he
deserves. Furthermore, given that Frank was long
considered to be a central and leading figure in Legal
Realism, it is worth considering whether scholars have not
only overlooked Frank, but have been blind to a whole other
dimension of Realist thought-one that emphasizes the
importance of human character to just adjudication and
that endorses the use of more "humanistic" methods in legal
theory. 1 ' Certainly, there are elements of such a view in
217. See LEITER, supra note 3, at 15-58 (calling for the "naturalization" of
jurisprudence and interpreting the Realists (except for Frank) as early
exponents of the view that the law can be studied most profitably using the
empirical methods of social science); Torben Spaak, Naturalism in
Scandinavian and American Realism: Similarities and Differences, in UPPSALA-
MINNESOTA COLLOQUIUM: LAW, CULTURE AND VALUES 33, 66-72 (Mattias
Dahlberg ed. 2009) (endorsing Leiter's interpretation of Legal Realism); see also
SCHLEGEL, supra note 2 (pointing to the Realists' interest in the empirical social
sciences as one of the movement's unifying features), Thomas ,J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 831, 834 (2008) (endorsing
and describing as a type of "new legal realism" the recent empirical work of
scholars who seek to fulfill the ambitions of the original Realists by measuring
judicial behavior using techniques borrowed from political science and
economics that are far more sophisticated than the Realists had at their
disposal); Victoria Nourse & Gregroy Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism:
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory? 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61,
100 (identifying empiricism as one of the common elements of new Realist
scholarship).
218. See supra note 11.
219. Interestingly, Critical Legal theorists seemed poised to develop further
this line of thought. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 626 (noting connections
between Realist thought and Critical Legal Studies). Like Frank, Critical
scholars ("Crits") were not persuaded that the empirical social sciences were the
key to legal progress. For instance, G. Edward White observed that a central
feature of Critical Legal thought was the "suggestion . .. that empirical research
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some of the later work of Karl Llewellyn,"' 0 and there may
be in the work of other Realists as well. This essay has not
defended such an ambitious claim, nor has it set out to. My
hope has been merely to suggest that we ought to attend to
some long-ignored insights of the movement known as Legal
Realism.
legitimated the status quo by implying that the 'facts' of the research were
somehow inevitably 'there' as part of a permanent 'reality' of American culture."
White, supra note 2, at 834. But the Crits apparently took little interest in the
one Realist who would have been most sympathetic to their philosophical
woridview, perhaps because they had different intellectual ambitions or political
goals. See Duxbury, supra note 21, at 198 (noting that Critical Legal theorists
found in Frank "little apart from an enduring iconoclasm").
220. In 1960, Llewellyn wrote:
The place to begin is with the fact that the men of our appellate bench are
human beings ... . And one of the more obvious and obstinate facts about
human beings is that they operate in and respond to traditions, and
especially to such traditions as are offered to them by the crafts they
follow. Tradition grips them, shapes them, limits them, guides them; not
for nothing do we speak of ingrained ways of work or thought, of men
experienced or case-hardened, of habits of mind.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 53 (1960).
